This chapter evaluates the ways in which the legal and normative demands of multiple equality strands are being addressed institutionally in the so-called ‗big three countries' of Western Europe. It deploys comparative analyses of current state-level reforms in the different types of institutions designed to implement equality policies in France, Germany and Britain. The chapter documents the ‗policy legacy' in the domain of equality found in each country at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the patterns of legal-political reforms underway, and evaluates the potential of these reforms for ‗institutionalising intersectionality'.
‗…women's policy machinery in France has consisted of highly politicised and marginalised state structures ' (1995) . In the mid-1990s, when a finally evolving conception of gender equality started reaching out to the high political spheres, an Observatoire de la Parité was added, with the task of studying solutions for a more equal representation of men and women in politics and anticipating the more ambitious reforms of the years 2000.
In contrast to Britain, in France the institutionalization of race equality did not occur at all and this in spite of France being certainly comparable to Britain as to the presence of ethnically diverse minorities resulting from a similarly important decolonization movement. The main reason for that is the clear state-based reluctance to break the concept of a uniform citizenry into subsets, of whatever nature. The second is an even stronger reluctance to embrace the notion of race, which is considered taboo and whose use revives memories of the French collaborationist past in World War II (Suk 2007) . It was not only until the mid-1990s that race equality in homeland France started being somehow addressed by politicians, first by the socialist minister of social affairs Martine Aubrey, and by the academia (Tribalat 1995; Fassin 2002) . Beforehand race inequality was in part addressed by criminal law protection (1972 Loi Plevin relative à la lutte au racism and the 1990 Loi Gayssot), in part by agencies tasked to improve the situation of migrant families or poor
neighbourhoods (e.g. the FASTIF, Fonds d'Action Sociale des Travailleurs Immigrés et de
Leur Famille, Social Action Fund for Immigrant Workers and Their Families). Sanctions for discriminatory dismissals were only established in labour law in 1982, and little used. Instead of establishing state bodies for the promotion of race equality, the French preferred to empower antiracist NGOs, by founding them and providing them with the power to initiate collective criminal antidiscrimination complaints (Bleich 2002) . Only since 1993, a state body, the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (CNCDH, National Advisory Commission on Human Rights) started reporting on issues of race, but always privileging a criminal perspective, which translated the fact that race, as scientifically inexistent and therefore taboo in itself, was long considered only as the object of the individual assaults of prejudiced individuals, and not as the target of systemic and entrenched societal inequality (Grigolo, Hermanin et al. 2011 ). Interestingly, a criminal approach to the fight against discrimination was also extended to disability by the laws of 1989 and 1990. As with France, in Germany the sole domain of equality that was institutionalised before 2000 was that of gender. Germany was neither an exporter nor a ‗net' importer of gender equality. Indeed, European Union directives in the field of equality have constantly been transposed with significant delays, showing a sort of underlying domestic resistance to Europeanization of antidiscrimination law, testified by the case law of the German Constitutional Court and harsh parliamentary debates about antidiscrimination law. The first statutory recognition of equality at work came through in 1979, in a context where the Constitutional Court still found legal to have difference in salaries given women and men's different roles within the family and most of the West German society, in particular in the Southern and more conservative Länder, remained deeply attached to this conception.
In spite of discrepancies with European Union law, the German equality machinery saw significant institutionalisation over the last decades, with 1,100 offices for women's affairs around the country in 1995 (Ferree 1995; Lang 2007) . The extensive spread of these bodies can be explained by two main factors. On the one hand, the federal structure of the country determined a multiplication of gender institutions, once they started blossoming during the 1980s at the level of the Länder, first in the North-West and social-democrat dominated states, and then everywhere in the country. States progressively established women's representatives (Frauenbeauftragten), women's affair departments as well as statelevel equal treatment laws. At federal level, only in 1986 was a Minister delegated with women's affairs. On the other hand, the reunification at the end of the 1990s caused the encounter of different conceptions of the roles of women in society and got into the Federal landscape a number of ex-women workers coming from the Eastern States and suffering from both high levels of unemployment and the encounter with a Western conception of women as only-part-time employed mothers. Even though the idea of gender equality was quite different in Western and Eastern Germany, the women's lobby in the East was successful in achieving the establishment of Gleichstellung (parity) offices during the transition period (Ferree 1995) and in placing the gender gap on the policy agenda (Kamenitsa and Geissel 2005) .
As a consequence, in 1994 a modification of the Basic Law introduced a Federal commitment towards the elimination of gender inequality and a Second Federal Equal Treatment Act (2. GleiBG, Second Equality Act) allowed positive actions at federal level to equalize the number of women candidates for public employment. Affirmative discrimination for women had already been set up by a number of Länder equal treatment laws in the domain of public employment, frequently on the initiative of the local political gender equality delegates, the Frauenbeauftragten. In the 1990s, two decisions of the European Court of Justice on affirmative actions for women established by the German Länders (in particular, the 1995 Kalanke and the 1997 Marschall rulings) confirmed the difficult nature of the EUGerman equality dialogue. However, the institutionalization of gender equality progressed also thanks to gender quota rules that political parties started adopting on a self-regulatory mode during the 1980s.
Following Ferree ‗… since for Germans -race‖ means the Holocaust, not subordination within the nation, the ability to see gender as in any way -like race‖ is limited' (2007) . The same reasoning applies the other way around, i.e. race could not be seen in any way -like gender‖ and explains the long absence of any race-based institutions in Germany. In the German case, the absence of race equality policy can be explained through similar lenses as those evoked for France plus an additional factor, namely that Germany has only recognised itself as a country of immigration (Einwanderungsland ) at the last turn of the In sum, the legacy of equality policies and institutions in Britain, France and Germany were quite distinct. Most significantly, Britain institutionalised both race and gender equality policies in a two-strand approach to equality from the 1970s onwards. By contrast, gender was the sole equality strand to be institutionalised in either France or Germany before 2000, with both these countries resistant to seeing race as comparable to gender in terms of their equalities infrastructure.
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Mapping Changing Equality Regimes in Britain, France and Germany
It is clear from the brief summary above that Britain, France and Germany developed distinct equality frameworks, with differing legislative and institutional mechanisms for addressing equality considerations. Notwithstanding these initial differences, all three have introduced a series of changes in these frameworks during the past 20 years. This section surveys the key aspects of these changes with a view to identifying whether we find convergence around a new multiple inequalities regime.
Britain saw two significant developments to its equality regime at the turn of the last century. The first key development, which complicated the bifurcated gender-race equality regime, was the introduction of The Disability Discrimination Act in 1995 and the establishment of the Disability Rights Commission in 2000. The focus on sex and race was thereby augmented by a newer focus on disability creating a three-strand approach to equality issues. However, the practice of treating each equality strand distinctly was not at this point challenged. The second key development was the introduction of the Race Relations Amendment Act in 2000, which included a positive legal duty on public authorities to promote racial equality. This represented an important move beyond the narrow antidiscrimination approach previously championed in Britain. The duty was not, initially, extended to either gender or disability, creating concerns about the separate-strands approach to equality in terms of differential levels of equality guarantees -and encouraging the gender and disability equality lobbies to argue for ‗upward harmonization' across the strands.
Overall, the piece-meal approach of developing distinct equality laws in relation to specific equality strands in Britain had created a complex array of equality laws (Gregory 1999; Rees 2002) , which was further complicated by devolution in Scotland and Wales (in which equality responsibilities were included in their constitutions). As a result of these developments Britain's equality framework comprised a patchwork of at least thirty Acts of Parliament, thirty-eight Statutory Instruments, eleven Codes of Practice, twelve EC Directives and the devolution statutes of 1998-9 (Chaney 2002:88) , leading many equality professionals to argue that British equality law was itself a source of inequality, applying to legislatures and government departments in different ways, privileging some social groupings over others. In addition, the introduction of The Human Rights Act (1998), which gave further effect in British law to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, enabled people in Britain to take cases about their human rights into a British court rather than to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. The rights contained in the Convention are included at Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act. Overall, Britain's equality regime had become fragmented and complex, but still did not formally engage with intersectional equality considerations.
Although devolution had added to this problem it also offered a model for its resolution, ushering in a move towards a more generic equalities framework. The Scotland Act 1998 places the Scottish Parliament under a commitment to mainstream equal opportunities ‗on grounds of sex or marital status, on racial grounds or on grounds of disability, age, sexual orientation, language or social origin, or of other personal attributes including beliefs or opinions such as religious beliefs or political opinions.' (Mackay and Bilton 2003) A generic Equality Unit was also established within the Scottish Executive to develop and support work on mainstreaming equality (Breitenbach, 2004: 13) . In this context, the continued existence of separate equality commissions in London began to look and around 100 statutory instruments with a single Act. The Act also strengthened discrimination law by requiring public bodies (such as the police and local councils) to give due regard to the need to tackle discrimination and promote equality through their purchasing functions. The Act also extended provisions previously applied to race, disability and gender to other forms of discrimination, including age, religion and belief and sexual orientation.
The introduction of the Equality Act, coupled with the creation of the ECHR, established a new streamlined equalities framework in Britain, which addressed equalities in general, rather providing specific guarantees for particular equality strands. Crucially, in relation to our focus on the institutionalisation of intersectionality, Section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 promised to make provision in respect of 'dual discrimination' by allowing a claim of direct discrimination to be brought in relation to a combination of two of the protected characteristics of age; disability; gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; sex; or sexual orientation. However, the newly-elected coalition Government announced in March 2011 that it would not be bringing forward the dual discrimination provision. The promised introduction of a measure that would have institutionalized intersectionality within the British Equality Act was abandoned.
Meanwhile, caught in the process of transposing new European Union antidiscrimination law, France started to overhaul part of its statutory regime and, more importantly, its universalistic and purely formal conception of equality during the 2000s. The result was a slow passage from a patchwork of legislation enshrined in a list of different acts and code articles essentially focused on gender and the protection of women at work, to a more comprehensive -but yet piecemeal and unequal-framework extending to all grounds mentioned in EU law, plus an additional and extended number of -originally French‖ suspect motives. Institutionalization proceeded similarly unevenly, with some enhancement for race, but not for the other grounds, leading to poor promises in terms of an intersectional approach. Progressively expanding in organizational resources and competences, the HALDE established a strong legal service, a network of decentralized referents in the provinces as well as a department for research and one for the consultation with the civil society. Its advisory council used to reunite representatives of the main NGOs for every motive of discrimination, while its steering body was lead for its first four years by an ex CEO of Renault. In terms of intersectionality, in spite of its being competent for a vast range of discrimination grounds, HALDE worked adopting an annual work programme which used to concentrate on one ground and one domain of discrimination at a time. Multiple discrimination aspects, thus, have not been addressed systematically, not even in the context of its activity of assessing individual complaints (Laulom 2009). In the annual figures on complaints released by the authority, for instance, the breakdown was organised by grounds of discrimination, but up to 2010, there used to be no data on complaints involving multiple grounds.
The institutional reconfiguration approved in 2011, whereby HALDE is to be merged with several conciliation bodies (the Médiateur de la République, the Défenseur des enfants and the Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité) to form a new authority headed by a figure called the Défenseur des Droits (Rights Defender or Ombudsman) does not look more promising in the move toward institutionalizing intersectionality. In fact, the institutions with whom HALDE had to be merged seem likely to bring the Défenseur des Droit's mandate away from its former multi-ground antidiscrimination focus as well as from the enhanced legal capacity HALDE had acquired.
In conclusion, what Mazur argued for political-administrative equality institutions created in the domain of gender, namely that ‗institutionalization consisted of highly politicised and marginalised state structures ' (1995) Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes) is the federal equality body established by the AGG.
The FADA is formally entrusted with operational autonomy, but in reality the agency was basically conceived as a specialised office placed at the dependence and within the premises of the -gender-age intersectional‖ Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. A multi-ground body, even though it formally started operations in 2006, FADA's work has long lacked any real visibility and impact. During its first years, the action of the agency was mainly devoted to collecting complaints and passing them on to the specialised Beauftragten, devising mediation and conciliation strategies, and funding research on discrimination issues. Nowadays, the legal competences of the federal agency are still scarce and its potential for assisting victims and contributing to the fight against discrimination is generally considered as low, even though the recent appointment of a new director, Christine Lüders, has generally been welcomed by equality lobbies.
As in the case of equality laws and positive actions for gender, also equality agencies were established at city level or at Land level before the adoption of the federal AGG. Some of them are public agencies established by the Länders or the city councils (e.g. in Munich, Hannover, Brandenburg, and Frankfurt am Main), while some others are managed by local NGOs. Among the latter, most have benefited from EU funds and training in order to provide counselling and legal advice on all forms of discrimination, but in particular on race and ethnic origin (e.g. the Antidiscrimination office of Cologne, the Antidiscrimination office of Saxony, and the Equal Treatment Office of Aachen). Both type of entities are closer to the end-users and have so far proved to be more in touch with the reality of discrimination, and also intersectional discriminations, as their federal counterpart.
The institutionalization of intersectionality is a long way from being achieved in the German case. However, some signs show a certain degree of opening towards the possible consideration of intersectional questions: the adoption of a comparable scope of application for antidiscrimination law concerning the various suspect motives, statutory mandates to address multiple discrimination questions conferred to the new equality body and to the ministry formerly charged with women affairs only, and an incipient mushrooming of decentralised offices and QUANGOs tasked with more discrimination grounds.
In summary, we can see that all three countries in this Western European region have experienced significant legislative and institutional change within their equality regimes in recent years. We can discern a shared movement towards a multiple inequalities approach, but the movement is generally limited to the antidiscrimination institutions, and outside of them, the various grounds have certainly not become institutionalized to the same extent.
Especially at the level of political representation and administrative bodies, prior equality norms continue privileging certain inequality strands in specific countries and to make it hard to embrace others. In addition, we can see that there has been very little progress in terms of the institutionalization of intersectionality in the ‗big three'. The inclusion of few provisions in respect of ‗dual discrimination' in Britain's Equality Act and of ‗multiple discrimination' in the mandate of the German antidiscrimination body are perhaps the clearest move to date towards the institutionalization of intersectionality in these countries of Western Europe.
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Analysing Equality Developments
The section above outlines the ways in which the legal and normative demands of multiple equality strands are being addressed institutionally in Britain, France and Germany. When considered together we can discern general patterns of development which are common to the three cases, but also identify certain country-specific features. Comparative analysis of the state-level reforms in the institutions designed to implement equality policies in these three countries suggests that there is a shared movement from a focus on single or dual equality strands, with a particular emphasis on gender equality in France and Germany, and on race and gender equality in Britain, towards antidiscrimination institutions that seek to integrate multiple equality strands under common policy and institutional umbrella. We can also see an increasing emphasis on symmetrical, complaints-driven equal treatment approaches. In Britain this has replaced the gender/race equality approaches previously in place. In all three countries we can see that institutional structures initially became more complex, with different institutional pillars responding differently to general European trends, and then opted to streamline structures by shifting the focus to more generic multiple inequality grounds.
Our analysis suggests that there has been a process of Europeanization in relation to antidiscrimination policy, and that this has taken a ‗vertical' form, in that Britain, France and Germany have each experienced adaptational pressure from the EU and have translated EU policies into domestic practice. There is little evidence of ‗horizontal' Europeanization, whereby the three countries might have shared good practice via the diffusion of ideas laterally (Radaelli 2003:40) . However, although there is evidence of vertical Europeanization, it is clear that the content and direction of this Europeanization has developed in interaction between EU and national, state and non-state actors through discursive processes. We argue that the different institutional structures in each of the three countries under consideration have created differing political opportunity structures, and that divergent equality norms -and approaches to immigration and multiculturalism in particularcreated differing discursive opportunity structures. These differences are manifest in the distinct ways in which civil society mobilisation has engaged with the changing equality regimes in Britain, France and Germany. In order to explain the lack of convergence, this section therefore focuses on the claims-making and policy debates that framed the approach to equality in each of the three countries. In what follows, first we will map the normative debates, then review the evolution in frames and finally consider the discussions around the configuration of the equality institutions.
Britain witnessed a full and vibrant debate about its ‗equality review' with extensive Government consultations and widespread civil society engagement. Two reviews were commissioned by the Government: The Equalities Review, established to carry out an investigation into the causes of persistent discrimination and inequality in British society; and the Discrimination Law Review, established to assess how anti-discrimination legislation could be modernised to fit the needs of Britain in the 21st century. There was also extensive consultation on the proposal to create a single equality body, following publication of the consultation document ‗Towards Equality and Diversity -Making it Happen'.
Organisations representing ‗new' equality strands -religious belief, sexuality and age -generally welcomed the proposal to create a single equality body. In its response to the government's consultation document ‗Towards Equality and Diversity -Making it Happen', the EOC stated categorically that it supported the creation of a single equality body, because it will ‗have the best chance of delivering effective work across all areas of equality on all the necessary levels i.e. single stand issues, general equality issues and inter-sectional or multiple discrimination issue'. (EOC 2003:1) In its press release following the Government's White Paper setting out plans to establish the CEHR, the EOC stated: ‗Having a single champion and a ‗one-stop-shop' for equality and human rights issues makes sense for individuals, employers and service providers. It will help make sure that all our equality laws, including new laws on age, belief and sexual orientation, are equally well understood, promoted and enforced.' (EOC 12/05/04) In support of the proposed CEHR, they have actively promoted ‗equality and diversity', rather than just gender equality. The Women's National Commission, which was established in 1969 as a publicly funded body ‗representing sectional interests' with a responsibility for ensuring consultation between government and women's organisations (Stokes 2003: 189) , was also broadly supportive of the proposal to create a CEHR, noting in its response to the Government's White Paper that although women's organisations tended to oppose the creation of the single equality body when it was first mooted, they now ‗believe that a degree of consensus has developed in support of the new This suggests that, while the transition to a multiple-inequalities approach was motivated by exogenous pressures in the form of EU directives (Fredman 2003:1) , British women's policy agencies have nonetheless played a positive role in facilitating the shift away from a separate approach to gender equality by actively working to introduce the new equality commission. Given that the transition appears to work to the potential detriment of existing women's policy agencies their role here appears to be somewhat paradoxical. Feminists have expressed concern that the recognition of ethnic minority and religious group rights may limit and erode the pursuit of gender equality (Okin 2000; Skjeie 2006 ), leading to anxieties that a multiple equalities agenda may undermine rather than facilitate gender justice. However, the gender consultative body in Britain expressed normative support for the move as an important means of addressing multiple discrimination issues experienced by minority women (YuvalDavis 1997), and also secured clear benefits in relation to gender equality as part of the transition, with a new public sector duty to promote gender equality being introduced in a process of levelling up with the race and disability lobbies.
Interestingly, in Britain it was the Race lobby who expressed most reservations about the creation of a single equality body. The CRE was frustrated that it was unable to fashion the agenda of the CEHR consultations, and at one point voiced its ‗unequivocal rejection' of the merger of the three existing commissions. Although, the CRE did successfully negotiate a series of changes that allowed it to offer its tentative support for the plans, it remained anxious that its relative strength would be compromised by the transition.
Comparative analyses of British citizenship practices have located Britain as advanced in relation to race equality, with Britain's multiculturalism frequently cited as a model for Europe (Koopmans and Statham, 2000) . As the most powerful agency with the most political clout, the CRE had most to lose in this process. With less political clout than the race lobby, fewer resources than the more recently created disability commission and weaker statutory duties than both, the gender lobby clearly had more to gain by the transition to the multipleequalities approach than did other inequality strands.
Consultations undertaken as part of the equality review also revealed that there were significant differences of opinion within Britain as to the extent to which laws aiming to ensure equality on the basis of religion, age and sexual orientation can or should mirror the existing provisions in the field of gender or race equality, with some analysts suggesting that religion and age should be treated as distinct from other forms of equality ‗markers' (Fredman and Spencer 2003) . Also, while most British commentators have been supportive of the creation of a single equality body and of the introduction of a single equality act that applies across the different non-discrimination grounds, there is continuing concern about both technical and normative challenges surrounding this project.
Yet it is striking that there was considerable support for the institutionalisation of intersectionality in British equality law amongst civil society actors, with British legal scholars arguing for the introduction on multiple discrimination provisions (Fredman and Szysczak 1992, Hannett 2003) . This debate led to Britain becoming one of a very few European countries to have provided for multiple-discrimination by explicitly recognising intersectional multiple-discrimination: ‗the discrimination involves more than one protected characteristic and it is the unique combination of characteristics that results in discrimination, in such a way that they are completely inseparable. This often occurs as a result of stereotyped attitudes or prejudice relating to particular combinations of the protected characteristics' (Government Equalities Office, 2009). Some commentators argue that the ‗holistic promise of intersectionality remains unfulfilled' (Solanke, 2010) because of the limitation to two grounds, which was introduced by government Equality ministers in the face of pressure from the business lobby (Hepple, 2010:16) . However, there is considerable normative support for the institutionalisation of intersectionality amongst equality advocates.
Since the end of the 1990s France has also been the arena of successive waves of public debates about equality, essentially concentrating on gender and race issues, on the normative aspects of introducing new equality policies, and on the definition of the categories of race and gender as targets for public policy. These debates certainly had an influence on the institutional set up of equality and antidiscrimination institutions that we discussed in the previous section.
As we have seen, the policy evolution of the early 2000 challenged the French republican model in a way that yield also to remodelling discursive frames and identities, up to a certain extent. The first wide-ranging debate on equality was hastened by the campaign in favour of gender -parity‖ in political representation. The debate inflamed the end of the 1990s, opposing those who supported the view that women could not simply be considered as a -category‖ to be proportionally represented, and those whose more practical view contemplated the possibility of affirmative action based on gender. Eventually, the campaign succeeded only when the supporters of parity started justifying it as a claim for the symbolic inscription of gender difference in political representation, rather than as a legitimate affirmative action measure (Bereni and Lépinard 2004; Baudino 2005) The second main debate that took place around and after 2000 focused on race and ethnicity, or rather -real or presumed race‖ -as it is currently phrased in French antidiscrimination laws-and diversity, as phrased by the centre-right political discourse.
Among the main problems that the debate addressed was that of how to study discrimination and grant equal opportunities to individuals with a migration background without surveying or classifying them using racial categories. This querelle, which started out during the end of the 1990s among demographists, was kept alive by a series of events, such as the need to This testified of an important change in frames that affected both the race and gender equality domains. In the case of race, grassroots organizations, race equality advocates and academics (Ndiaye 2008) The Diversity Charter followed of only a few years the -Equality Charter‖ proposed by the Ministry for Women's Affairs. In this case, according to Mazur and Baudino, the Charter, as well as the notion of -parity‖, were policy options championed in order provide a French alternative to gender mainstreaming, an approach that was hard to enroot and even to translate into French (Baudino 2005; Mazur 2007) . As in the case of race, whereas political institutions were oriented towards milder notions (parity) and institutional approaches (i.e. the Charter), gender grass-roots movements employed more provocative frames, and one of the main movements for the parity campaign was significantly named Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither whores, nor subjects). The leader of this movement became a State Secretary in the first Fillon government (2007) and then general inspector for social affairs (2011).
To summarize, the debates of the years 2000 testify how, in France, gender and race are still in struggle for a universally accepted definitions as targets for public action. This helps understanding why, for gender and race, the antidiscrimination approach pressed by topdown Europeanization is assorted with a number of political-administrative bodies and consultative bodies that translate in a disintegrated, unbalanced political-institutional approach to equality.
In contrast to Britain, the institutional configuration of equality institutions was never the object of an intensive societal debate, but was rather devised upon expert reports delivered to the central institutions and implemented with a top-down approach. The establishment of GELD, for instance, followed up the first years of the dispute on racial categorization, and was prompted by a specialised report commissioned to a senior member of the Council of the State who recommended the establishment of a single-ground body focusing on race (Belorgey 1999) . The passage from the GELD to the HALDE was mainly determined by the transposition of the EU equality directives and by the principle that, as no subsection of the French population could be privileged on another, there should not be privileged grounds of discrimination among those quoted in the new law of 2001. This is why the HALDE was immediately conceived as a multi-ground body, charged to work on all the sixteen discrimination motives. The details on the functioning and competences of the future institutions were outlined by a new expert report, the Stasi Report (Stasi 2004) , which implied an impressive consultation process involving political and administrative actors, civil society organizations, legal experts, enterprises and even foreign experts and equality bodies for a total of about one-hundred fifty interviews.
Regarding other equality ‗markers' the mainstreaming action promoted by the HALDE certainly had an impact on public awareness. Discrimination became a term used in the public debate but remains limited, so far, to the classical single-ground approach. The 2011 review which is going to merge HALDE with three pre-existing ombudsmen was met with anxiety by a part of the French audience and the body itself. The principal fear is that such a reform might significantly slow down the rapid progression of the new antidiscrimination authority and its litigation competences, widening its scope of action to domains not covered by antidiscrimination law (minors rights, deontology and security, etc.) and where the body would only be able to exert a mere mediation role.
Germany is a perhaps a uniqum in Western Europe as regards the framing of the normative debate on equality. The introduction of EU antidiscrimination law in German code books was in fact met per se with scepticism by a very large part of society (Treib 2006) , ranging from conservative and liberal MPs to the legal academia, the Church and vocational organizations, as well as business representatives, i.e. the majority of the columns of the German corporatist system. The six-year-long parliamentary debate around the law was sustained by fears that antidiscrimination law would ‗significantly shrink the constitutional protected area of private liberty which includes the freedom to choose who to associate with, who to live with, who to conduct transactions with, and that the law would also in the end create a duty to contract, thus forcing people into relationships they would not freely choose' (Gehring 2005) .
i The debate was centred around two opposing frames: antidiscrimination (Antidiskriminierung), on the one side, and freedom to contract, on the other side, and fuelled surprising that when the law was finally adopted, even though it was not completely denaturized in its scope, it was at least renamed, (Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgestez, General Equal Treatment Law), provided with large exceptions, and, especially, provisions for a low profile enforcing agency. The structure of the FADA was never debated again, while on the side of litigation, very shortly after the enactment of the General Equal Treatment Act It is finally to be mentioned that also in the German case, the framing of race discrimination/equality did not encounter a smooth terrain. Recently, the German institute of Human Rights, a consultative body charged with advising on equality issues, was supported by many when it argued in favour of the deletion of the word race from the German constitution (Cremer 2010) . As in the French case -where a similar amendment was proposed in 2007, the term ethnic origin is widely preferred to race in the equality discourse. As Ferree explains well, this is mainly due to the fact that for Germans racial boundaries have always been conceived as external to the German polity (Ferree 2007) . This has been true at least until the citizenship reform of the year 2000, which finally extended citizenship to Germanborn migrant offspring.
A truly intersectional issue that gave floor to both vast political debates and decided responses in terms of institutionalization is that of the religious clothing worn by women belonging to ethnic minorities. In Germany, state laws have sanctioned the ban on the wearing of headscarves by school teachers early in the 2000s (Sacksofski 2009 ). In France, institutionalization went so far as to bringing to the adoption of two national laws, in 2004, on headscarves in schools, and 2011, on public displaying of face-covering veils (Loenen 2009).
In both countries, the laws inexplicitly but directly affect one sole group, that of Muslim women (Scott 2007) . This ‗negative institutionalization ' has not yet been matched, in either country, by actual equality policies that would target the same individuals, who are at the intersection of three otherwise seemingly fully-protected-through-recent-equality-law subsets.
Conclusion
Overall, we find only some evidence of convergence towards a multiple-inequalities approach. In the three cases antidiscrimination institutions were forced to evolve towards an almost ‗harmonised model' given the level of detail of the EU equality directives and their being fundamentally inspired by an Anglo-Saxon adversarial civil law framework. However, notwithstanding this evolution, the variation in the configuration given to the other institutions set up to enforce or promote equality and in the nature of the domestic discourses on equality is clearly more significant. We find clear evidence of continued variation in terms of the legislative framework, equalities machinery and discursive framing of equality policy in the ‗Big Three'.
Across the three countries considered we have identified a movement from a focus on parallel equality regimes with particular emphasis on gender equality and race or gender equality only, towards antidiscrimination regimes integrating multiple equality strands under common policy umbrellas. To the extent that convergence is identified, we would suggest that this is most clearly influenced by a vertical Europeanisation. Britain, France and Germany have all experienced adaptational pressure from the EU and have translated EU policies into domestic practice. Still, while in France and Britain the reforms in the equality domain which took place in the years 2000 were also partially supported, or at least met, with vast societal discussion by the domestic polity, in the German case the adoption of antidiscrimination law seem to have happened more in reaction to forced Europeanization. We have found little evidence of regional influences, such as neighbour imitation and benchmarking traditions. As a result there is no real evidence of a distinct convergence proper to the ‗Big Three'.
Finally, we have found little evidence of the institutionalisation of intersectionality.
Where intersectionality has been institutionalised, this appears to have largely been driven by civil society mobilization.
